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Abstract 
 
The matter of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans has become overshadowed by pressing issues such as 
Brexit, the rise of the radical right and international terrorism. Notwithstanding the pressure to address these 
issues accordingly, increasing tensions and ethnic outbursts across the Western Balkan region are reason 
enough for the European Union to devote significant attention to accession talks. This article addresses the 
Western Balkan countries’ Europeanization process with consideration of Russia as an external actor. By 
assessing the candidate countries’ progress amid EU negotiations, the article suggests that the countries’ 
bilateral ties with Russia have an impact on the Europeanization process which is particularly visible in 
Chapter 31 Foreign, security, and defence policy of the acquis communautaire. The broader geopolitical 
framework that comprises the multifaceted relationship between the EU and Russia is crucial for 
understanding the dynamics of EU-Western Balkans-Russia triangle. 
 
Keywords: Western Balkans, European Union, Europeanization process, Russia, EU-Russia relations, 
geopolitics 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There “will be no enlargement in the next five years, the EU needs to mark a pause 
in its enlargement process so that we can consolidate what has been done with 28”, were 
the exact words of president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in 2014, 
when he reassured the public that no further enlargement would take place under his 
presidency. Although more than half his mandate has already passed, recent developments 
do not provide hope for a change after Juncker leaves his post. Global changes which 
brought about the (un)expected presidency of Donald J. Trump might alter the nature of US 
foreign policy in Transatlantic relations and affect further EU transformative power in its 
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neighbourhood. The presence of various external actors throughout the Western Balkan 
region might stifle countries’ progress towards the EU due to their various security, 
economic, and political interests. Along these lines, this article sees its purpose in 
inspecting one of those external factors which have a sound possibility to impede the 
progress toward the EU. 
This article proves that the Western Balkan region does not rely solely on the EU, 
but also on other external factors which have a real possibility to exert influence through 
various channels including, but not limited to, pragmatic and materialistic factors which 
relate to economic, security, and geopolitical benefits. By looking at i) visits and statements 
of high officials, ii) country’s stance on sanctions against Russia, and iii) European 
Commission progress reports with a special emphasis on Chapter 31 Foreign, security, and 
defence policy (hereinafter Chapter 31), the article demonstrates that Russian leverage in 
countries which tend to nurture closer bilateral ties with Moscow comes at the expense of 
hindering the Europeanization process at times when EU-Russia relations are overly 
negative. The cases of Croatia and Serbia are subjected to in-depth scrutiny within a closely 
defined framework. The periods of positive (2008-2011) and negative EU-Russia relations 
(2012-2016) were chosen according to the work of Forsberg and Haukkala (2016). The 
article encourages two research questions: “How do country’s close bilateral ties with 
Russia affect the Europeanization process?” and “How could the volatile nature of EU-
Russia relations be the reason for stalling the Europeanization process in countries with 
closer ties to Russia?”  
 
RATIONALE BEHIND THE WESTERN BALKANS’ EU ASPIRATIONS 
 
The basic equation underpinning the enlargement decision for eligible neighbouring 
states has not changed: the benefits of joining the EU (and the costs of being excluded from 
it) create incentives for governments to satisfy EU’s extensive entry requirements 
(Vachudova 2014, 128). National governments have an incentive to co-operate where 
policy coordination increases their control over domestic policy outcomes, permitting them 
to achieve goals that would not otherwise be possible (Moravscik 1993, 485). The reasons 
for EU to support enlargement to the WB are the same as for earlier enlargements: fostering 
stable democratic regimes in the EU’s backyard (or internal courtyard). There is the 
perception of abiding geopolitical risks: the EU will pay the price in myriad ways for ethnic 
conflict, economic collapse, lawlessness, instability and poor governance in the region if it 
does not pursue enlargement (Vachudova 2014, 126). The escalation of ethnic and political 
conflicts in a fragile WB region could cast doubt on the EU transformative power, 
effectiveness and credibility as a foreign policy actor. If the pace [of enlargement] does 
decelerate, overshadowed by the economic and political crises within the European Union, 
Europe might lose the Balkans once more to nationalism, violence and further breakdowns 
of agreed states and borders, or it might lose its leverage to other actors who may not share 
similar views and values with the EU (Balfour and Stratulat 2011, 2). 
Academic works so far have sought to examine the EU strategy towards WB 
countries, as well as the ongoing democratization process (Türkes and Gökgöz 2006; 
Rupnik 2011; Veljanoska et al. 2014). Türkes and Gökgöz (2006) put forward an argument 
how the EU strategy as integrated and effective seem quite reasonable, particularly if one 
considers the quantity of post-Dayton EU initiatives. Blockmans (2007) argues how 
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mismanagement of the remaining ethnic-territorial and constitutional issues in the WB 
could have severe and destabilizing consequences, including a greater likelihood of 
political extremism, an increase in organized crime and other illegal economic activities, 
terrorism, armed conflict and further human displacement. Leaving WB countries to deal 
with the remaining ethnic-territorial and constitutional issues alone would have a damaging 
effect, which would eventually lead to a negative spillover onto neighbouring EU member 
states.  
 
RUSSIA AS AN EXTERNAL (F)ACTOR 
 
Russian interests in WB are driven by several factors. Firstly, Russia, being a 
permanent member of UN Security Council, has the right to veto every decision aimed at 
WB countries that does not match Russian interests. The Kremlin’s actions in the region – 
including meddling in the domestic politics of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Montenegro, and wielding its UN Security Council veto on 
Balkan matters, or threatening to – have only reinforced the notion that Russia “is back” in 
the region (Lasheras et al. 2016). It makes Russia present in the region not only via 
disinformation strategy but also by directly influencing political debates and interfering in 
countries’ internal affairs, as it was the case in 2016 when Russia was accused of 
organising plot to assassinate Montenegrin Prime Minister (PM) (Forster 2016). Secondly, 
Ralchev (2012) argues how the WB region is of strategic importance as a transit route for 
Russian gas. Where gas is imported, Russia’s Gazprom often enjoys exclusive rights with 
respect to access to infrastructure and other non-competitive privileges, such as a 
prohibition of re-sale or re-export (International Energy Agency 2008). Thirdly, Clark and 
Foxwall (2014) emphasize this ideational dimension of Russian foreign policy which 
manifests itself through Slavic roots and Orthodox religion in some countries in the 
Balkans. Common traditional and cultural values again after the Soviet collapse became the 
foundation for dialogue at a high political level between Russia and the Western Balkans 
leaders (Lo 2002).  
Russia’s impact on EU external governance is also detectable. The external 
governance is determined by the EU's power and its interdependence with regard to third 
countries as well as competing “governance providers” in its neighborhood and at the 
global level – mainly the US and Russia (Lavenex and Schimmelfenig 2010). The EU 
enlargement has indirectly bolstered an atmosphere of contestation between the EU and 
Russia not only in the shared neighborhood (Ukraine, Moldova, and South Caucasus) but 
also in WB region where Russia has its geopolitical interests. The European Union is not 
only the primary trading partner but also a source of identity for, and a challenge to, 
Russia’s domestic and foreign policy choices (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016, 4).  
By enlarging to the East, the EU had the leverage to influence the wider 
environment in which Russian economic interests were challenged. [M]any issues where 
the EU has tried to exercise its influence have been matters that have belonged to 
Moscow’s own remit as a fully sovereign decision-maker (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016, 9). 
Moscow’s strategic alliance with several WB countries provides a low-cost opportunity for 
Russia to undertake hybrid action to undermine European objectives in the Balkans 
(Weslau and Wilson 2016).  
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SCRUTINIZING COUNTRIES’ TIES TO RUSSIA AMID EU NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Croatian progress toward the EU was determined more by its neighbours, rather 
than other external factors. According to the 2008 progress report, regional disputes with 
Slovenia over borders and tensions with Serbia over Serb minority in Croatia, as well as 
unresolved war crimes and mutual file suits before International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), were to be strengthened in the future. In point of fact, the 
analysis of progress reports did not detect any proof of Russian impact on Croatian 
accession negotiations during the period 2008–2012 which also marked last years of 
negotiations. The only disagreement between Croatia and the EU over Russia was about 
visa facilitation regime, although the decision to grant a temporary free visa for Russian 
citizens was economically motivated, rather than showing any signs of purposefully 
countering EU regulations. 
With respect to Chapter 31, between the 2008 and 2011, Croatia had already made a 
substantial progress and had reached a high level of alignment with the EU regulations. 
Positive expressions were used to describe Croatia’s progress: “country remains 
committed”, “continued to support”, “reinforced its participation”, “efforts are continuing”, 
and “adopted the relevant decisions” (Croatia 2010, 2011 progress reports). The European 
Commission was fully satisfied with Croatia’s cooperation, especially with the UN Security 
Council as a non-permanent member, OSCE, as well as with NATO, the member of which 
Croatia became in 2009. By 2011, Croatia was already a member of the UN, the OSCE, the 
Council of Europe and NATO, which enabled the country to actively take part in the 
decision-making process in these organisations. In 2012, a year prior to joining the EU, 
Croatia succeeded in meeting all the requirements concerning Chapter 31 and was ready to 
implement the acquis. 
Apropos of Serbia, during the period of positive EU-Russia relations (2008-2011), 
there were no statements which would indicate that the cooperation with Russia would, in 
any case, interfere with Serbian progress in EU negotiations. Moreover, European 
Commission placed a special emphasis on the process of privatisation and liquidation of 
socially and state-owned enterprises as one of the key priorities of the European Partnership 
for Serbia (Serbia 2010 progress report). A Memorandum of Understanding with Russia on 
energy comprised several agreements, including privatisation and modernisation of oil 
company NIS, completion of the construction of underground gas storage facility and the 
passing of the Northern branch of the South Stream pipeline through Serbia (Serbia 2008 
progress report). Reports have assessed Serbia’s foreign policy cooperation with four main 
pillars – the EU, the US, Russia, and China, as “good”.  
As regards to the Chapter 31, 2011 and 2012 progress reports show Serbia’s 
positive advancement in alignment with the majority of EU declarations and Council 
decisions, as well as participations in CSDP missions. Judging by the use of positive 
expressions ‒ “engage actively”, “continued to implement”, “improved its alignment”, 
“agreed to participate”, “preparations are well on track” ‒ European Commission was 
satisfied with the overall advancement in Chapter 31. Unlike previous reports, the 2014 and 
2015 progress reports brought more disagreements regarding CFSP. Although the 2014 
report noted that Serbia supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the 
main problem was Serbia’s absence at the vote of UN General Assembly Resolution on the 
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territorial integrity of Ukraine. Another major disappointment for the European 
Commission came in light of restrictive measures which were introduced in response to the 
illegal annexation of Crimea when Serbia refused to adopted Council’s decision. At the 
end, overall assessment of Serbia’s performance in Chapter 31 lost its overly positive 
adjectives from the previous reports and was downgraded to an expression “preparations in 
this field are on track” (Serbia 2014 progress report). In the 2015 progress report, the 
Commission recognized the newly formed geopolitical context with respect to Ukraine and 
placed a special emphasis on “the improvement of alignment with EU declarations and 
Council decision” alluding to Serbia’s refusal to align with the Council’s decision a year 
prior to it. Also, conducting joint military drills was seen as the “continuation of high-level 
contacts with Russia”.  
 
COUNTRIES’ FOREIGN POLICY OUTLOOK 
 
Croatia’s state visits and official talks with Russia were mostly held in the first 
period of the analysed time frame (2008-2011) and were based on economic talks and 
cooperation in technical, energy and tourism sectors, rather than being politically 
motivated. Both President Mesic and PM Kosor sought to deepen economic ties with 
Russia and further strengthen mutual relations. “There is a lot of space for progress in 
relations between Russian Federation and Croatia” and “Croatia, being the 28th EU 
member, will absolutely support cooperation between the EU and Russia”, noted PM Kosor 
in Moscow in March 2010 (Government of the Republic of Croatia 2010). Close relations 
between Croatia and Russia continued in 2013 when President Josipovic held brief talks 
with MFA Lavrov on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference and stated that 
“Croatia will become a member of the EU in less than half a year, which will mark a new 
chapter for relations between Croatia and Russia. We hope that our governments will use 
our membership in the EU to contribute to the cooperation between our two countries” 
(Tportal 2013). 
The example of how political tensions can result in the rupture of the economic 
relations came on the eve of Croatian-Russian Economic Forum which was supposed to 
take place in November 2016. Following PM Plenkovic’s official visit to Ukraine, where he 
stated that “Croatia’s experience in peaceful integration of occupied areas could be very 
useful to Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea” (Government of the Republic of Croatia 2016), 
the Forum was cancelled as Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concerns about 
Croatia meddling into Ukraine internal affairs. 
Conversely, Serbia-Russia relations reached new heights with Russia becoming 
Serbian voice in the UN Security Council on matters of Kosovo and Metohija. In the period 
between 2008 and 2016, two Russian presidents, the PM and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) visited Belgrade eight times, while Serbian officials were hosted in Moscow nine 
times in total. There was at least one official visit per year among the highest ranked 
officials of Serbia and Russia taking place either in Belgrade or Moscow, whereas Croatia 
never saw President Putin paying an official visit to Zagreb, neither had Russian MFA 
Lavrov been to Croatia. President Medvedev in 2009 and President Putin in 2011 (his first 
visit after ten years) marked their presence in Belgrade and granted Serbia the opportunity 
to combine two important foreign policy aspirations: EU membership and Russian 
partnership.  
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 3, No. 2, 2017 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com 
            
 
14 
 
In 2014, when EU-Russia relations were on the brink of collapse due to the Russian 
annexation of Crimea, Medvedev and Putin once more visited Belgrade. By referring to the 
“common Slavic background, language, faith, traditions, and culture, but also the fact that 
Russia and Serbia have always been on the same side”, the former President Nikolic 
emphasized how “invaluable Russian support for maintaining the territorial integrity 
and Serbian independence is, specifically regarding Kosovo and Metohija” (Kremlin 2014). 
In December 2016 during the official visit of MFA Lavrov to Belgrade, MFA Dacic praised 
Serbian relations with Russia. “Without Russia, it is impossible to protect our territorial 
sovereignty. When we talk about Russia, we talk about our future. Serbia will never be anti-
Russian country. We will not join sanctions against Russia. And we certainly do not intend 
to become NATO members” (Telegraf 2016).  
The divergence between Croatia and Serbia can also be observed in the matter of 
sanctions against Russia. Former Croatian PM Milanovic stated how “Ukraine is falling 
apart as a country, and Russia, who has gone beyond what is acceptable in Crimea, should 
be warned not to go further” (Novilist 2014). Going against the unanimous EU decision 
was, therefore, not even considered among Croatian political leadership, as political 
relations with Moscow were always of a more irresolute nature. Nonetheless, rather than 
halting all political tasks with Russia, Croatia decided to adopt a pragmatic stance and 
campaigned for a two-way communication and a political dialogue as the only way for 
resolving the unfolding crisis. On the contrary, Serbia justified the unequivocal support for 
Russia amidst Ukrainian crisis by economy loses that sanctions would bring to financial 
and energy sectors, in particular. This would leave Serbian economy even more vulnerable 
and unable of undertaking reforms which are necessary to keep the pace with the EU 
obligations under acquis (EurActiv 2016). When a new round of sanctions came on the EU 
agenda, Serbian MFA Dacic stated that “talks about imposing sanctions on Russia at this 
stage are out of questions since it goes against Serbian national interest” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia 2016).  
On top of that, the current Croatian government sits in contrast with coalition 
governments in Serbia throughout both periods. Whilst Croatian coalition government after 
joining the EU showed unilateral support for the EU integration and distanced itself from 
Russia, the Serbian coalition government under current President Vucic is not as 
unequivocal in foreign policy and tends to shift preferences to both Moscow and Brussels. 
The Serbian government did not play a major role in deterring relations with Russia, but it 
had caused additional tensions with the EU, especially after 2014 when Belgrade refused to 
align with EU sanctions. It thus seems that Serbia’s foreign policy tends to be more 
straightforward toward Russia, while Croatian government stays prudent and follows the 
political climate in the EU.   
 
CONCLUSION 
  
The Western Balkan region carries geostrategic significance for the security of the 
Mediterranean and Southern Europe, which serves as an incentive to international actors 
that strive to include the Western Balkans countries into any sort of regional (EU) and 
or/global (NATO) security complex. This article pinpointed possible complexities in the 
EU policy toward the region that are being exploited by foreign actors other than the EU 
itself. In the sample of two cases, Serbia showed a higher level of cooperation with Russia 
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in a bilateral, economic and strategic sense, and offered less successful performance during 
accession talks with the EU. The evidence of a country stalling the Europeanization process 
throughout the period of negative EU-Russia relations (2012-2016) was observed in 
Chapter 31. It proved that the alternation in EU-Russia relations has an impact on the 
overall outcome of WB countries’ attitudes toward the EU. In Croatia’s case, stances on 
Russia throughout both periods shifted in accordance with the EU official foreign policy 
narrative which caused severance of ties with Russia during the negative period of EU-
Russia relations (2012-2016).   
 To that end, given strong Russian presence in certain Western Balkan countries, 
Europeanization becomes more costly for these countries due to their inability to align with 
and commit to every EU ruling during the accession talks. At the initial stage of 
negotiations, the EU is unable to impose strong conditionality toward candidate countries 
which then grants a promising niche to Russia to act as a security, financial and/or political 
guarantor in those countries. Europeanization may be hindered as long as Russia imposes 
itself as a security provider in the region. By having Russia as an ally, political leadership 
in Western Balkan countries is prone to be influenced by the Kremlin while aligning with 
EU decisions that negatively affect Russia, as it was the case with sanctions in 2014. After 
the adoption of the first round of sanctions in 2014, both PM Medvedev and President Putin 
visited Belgrade in order to ensure the continuity of political and strategic cooperation with 
Serbia. In this respect, traditionally good relations with Russia affect the rapprochement 
towards the EU during the accession negotiations. 
 Notwithstanding strong Russian presence in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries 
through military, security and economic mechanisms, this article revealed that the 
Kremlin’s influence stretches to the Western Balkans as well. As a consequence, in the 
Western Balkans and former Soviet Space where Russia claims to have historical or 
privileged interests, countries experience strong Russian presence that is preventing them 
from committing completely to the horizontal institutionalization necessary for EU 
membership. Increasing tensions in the region across several Western Balkans countries 
urge for devotion and a clear strategy on behalf of the EU. For these reasons, although 
perceived as a peripheral question, the enlargement to the Western Balkans might be crucial 
at times when the capacity of the EU has been put to the test.  
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